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WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF  
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
R. GEORGE WRIGHT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout much of constitutional law and beyond, courts 
often decide cases by applying some form of tiered or multilevel 
judicial scrutiny.1  Tiered scrutiny exhibits remarkable variability 
and complexity.2  At its simplest, tiered scrutiny involves a judicial 
inquiry into the legitimacy and the degree of importance of some 
public goal purportedly furthered by the government policy at 
issue.  The courts then typically undertake a second step, 
inquiring into the degree of “tailoring” of the government policy—
namely the policy’s overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness 
relative to its supposed purpose.3  This simplified account of tiered 
scrutiny conceals, however, a number of important problems.  The 
undue complications, manipulability, oft-mistaken emphases, and 
other costs of tiered scrutiny are, by now, conspicuous and 
remarkable.  Tiered scrutiny review has decayed to the point to 
which its use is no longer justifiable. 
Among other basic problems, tiered scrutiny now offers only 
the appearance, but not the reality of, reasonable efficiency and 
appropriate constraint on judicial subjectivity and discretion.  The 
practice of tiered scrutiny today clearly undermines several basic 
rule of law principles.4  This Article suggests that a simpler, more 
 
† Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. 
1 See generally R. George Wright, What If All the Levels of Judicial Scrutiny Were 
Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 165 (2014). 
2 See id. at 170. For a sense of the historical development of the levels of judicial 
scrutiny, see generally Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical 
Judiciary, 14 GEO. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 475 (2016); G. Edward White, Historicizing 
Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
3 For a relatively simple, but self-conscious and probing, application of a tiered 
scrutiny schema, see the explicit sex discrimination case of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976) (applying a version of what is classified as intermediate scrutiny to 
the state statute at issue). 
4 For standard, and quite substantially overlapping, multiple-element accounts of 
the rule of law, see TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (Penguin Books 2011) (2010). 
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rule of law-friendly substitute for tiered scrutiny is realistically 
available,5 and that such a substitute encourages more pragmatic 
lawmaking.6   
This Article thus recommends replacing today’s readily 
manipulable and otherwise crucially defective tiered scrutiny 
analysis with a substitute requiring fewer and better-working 
parts.  In particular, this Article recommends a stronger judicial 
concern for a legislative policy’s actual effectiveness in practice 
and far less concern for questions of tailoring.7  This Article  
also recommends a more serious judicial accommodation of 
constitutionally fundamental rights.8 
 
See also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270–71 (2d ed. 2011); LON 
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 1969); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE 
RULE OF LAW:  HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 80–83, 90 (2004); Marc O. DeGirolami, 
Faith in the Rule of Law, 82 ST. JOHN’S  L. REV. 573, 578–79 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
47-48 (1997); Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1691, 1704-06 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 
GA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2008). A fuller account of typical presentations of the rule of law 
values appears infra at note 141. 
5 See infra Parts II–III. 
6 See infra Parts II–III. For some ironic complications of the idea of simplicity, see 
R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t 
Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 735 (2000). 
7 Importantly, the degree of “tailoring” of the government policy to the scope of 
the problem sought to be remedied by that policy, as a matter of degrees of 
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness, may actually have little to do with the 
severity or the constitutional insignificance of the policy’s impact on persons 
inadvertently affected by the policy. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. 
Degrees of tailoring between the scope of a perceived problem and the scope of the 
persons or interests actually affected by the policy at issue can be thought of in terms 
of typical Venn diagram degrees of overlapping, or lack thereof. See, e.g., What is a 
Venn Diagram, LUCIDCHART, https://www.lucidchart.com/pages/venn-diagram (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2019). But overlap, or degrees of overlap, in this “tailoring” sense, tells 
us virtually nothing about the nature, severity, or significance of the government 
policy’s actual impact on any affected party. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying 
text. A Venn diagram tells us about a merely two-dimensional overlap, but nothing 
about the three-dimensional depth, severity, gravity, inescapability, impact, or the 
mere superficiality of that overlap. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. The 
real severity of any burden a policy imposes on an affected party, intentionally or 
unintentionally, is in contrast, much more usefully pursued by asking about the value 
of any alternative unregulated courses of action still available to the party challenging 
the government policy. What can the affected party still do, at appropriate cost? See 
infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. See generally R. George Wright, 
Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No 
Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2090–96 (2015); R. George Wright, The 
Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Analysis and the Central Importance of 
Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57, 77–80 (1989) [hereinafter 
Unnecessary Complexity].  
8 See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
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The aim of these recommended revisions is to channel  
judicial scrutiny in the most useful directions, to simplify and 
appropriately constrain judicial analyses, to encourage 
substantially effective legislative policies, and to otherwise better 
promote basic rule of law values.9  None of these suggested reforms 
would authorize courts to usurp the proper legislative role or 
otherwise empower courts to stray beyond the area of judicial 
competency by second-guessing calculations of policy costs or by 
performing general cost-benefit analyses of statutes and 
regulations.10   
I. TIERED SCRUTINY’S TYPICAL INDIFFERENCE TO ANY 
QUESTIONS OF THE ACTUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF A  
CHALLENGED GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Where fundamental rights are unaffected and no suspect 
legislative classification is employed, courts ordinarily defer to a 
legislature’s choice among policy options, at least.11  This general 
rule of judicial deference to legislative policy judgments recurs, in 
particular, throughout equal protection case law applying what is 
known as minimum scrutiny of the legislative choice; this 
minimum scrutiny requires merely a rational, and often 
presumed, basis for the legislative policy choice.12 
 
 
9 See infra Parts I–II. 
10 A focus on whether a policy has, in practice, substantially advanced some 
government interest does not, as discussed below, involve a broad cost-benefit 
assessment. See infra Parts II–III. Similarly, the focus herein deemphasizes mere ex 
ante predictions as to how effective a policy will eventually turn out to be in practice. 
See infra Parts II–III. Finally, judicial inquiry into whether a given aim has in practice 
been substantially advanced does not license courts to assess the degree of importance 
of the government interest sought to be advanced. See infra Parts II–III. As it turns 
out, significant analytical simplifications can be made at minimal cost in terms of the 
attractiveness of the judicial outcome on the merits. This Article then recommends a 
further simplification, in the form of avoiding a judicial balancing test, or a test of 
proportionality, especially when genuinely fundamental constitutional rights are 
being substantially burdened. See infra Parts II–III. For background on judicial 
proportionalism, and on “exacting” and “strict” judicial scrutiny, see R. George Wright, 
A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV. 207, 207–08 (2016). For a classic 
defense of the status of genuinely fundamental rights, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY XI, 192 (1977). 
11 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1970). 
12 See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at  
484–85. 
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Thus the idea of equal protection, in particular, is typically 
“not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic  
of legislative choices.”13  Judicial resistance to “second-guess” 
legislative policy choices, absent any concern for fundamental 
rights or suspect legislative classifications, recurs throughout 
much of the pertinent case law.14  Otherwise put, courts do not “sit 
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect 
fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.”15 
This judicial deference thus extends to questions of the 
“wisdom, fairness, [and] logic”16 of the legislative choice.  Typically, 
courts will not require a legislature to attack any social or 
economic ill in its full scope; a legislature may instead single out 
one aspect of a perceived problem without committing to any 
 
13 Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
632 (1996). 
14 See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 
753–54 (2011) (public financing of elections); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–90 (2005) (a 
major eminent domain case reaffirming judicial deference to state governmental 
judgments without second-guessing their wisdom or efficiency); Mansell v. Mansell, 
490 U.S. 581, 583, 594 (1989) (statutory protection of military retirees); Rodriguez v. 
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (“Deciding what competing 
values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the 
very essence of legislative choice.”) (recognizing multiple statutory purposes); W. & 
So. Life Ins. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 670 (1981); U. S. R.R. 
Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 197 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pulte Home Corp. 
v. Montgomery Cty., 909 F.3d 685, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (“It is not this court’s place to 
second-guess the wisdom of elected local officials in making inherently discretionary 
zoning decisions.”) (applying the deference principle not only to state governmental 
legislative determinations, but to state administrative agency decisions as well); Cure 
Land, L.L.C. v. USDA, 833 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir. 2016) (applying the deference 
principle to judicial review of a federal administrative agency’s substantive decision 
making priorities); Sensational Smiles, L.L.C. v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 
2015) (upholding even “rent-seeking” legislation) (legislatures need not articulate 
their motivating reasons); Bonidy v. USPS, 790 F.3d 1121, 1128 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(applying the deference principle to a postal service regulation); Gordon v. Holder, 721 
F.3d 638, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (addressing congressionally-chosen means of 
addressing illicit mail deliveries of tobacco); Martin v. Haas, 556 S.W.3d 509, 515 (Ark. 
2018) (state court applying the deference principle to state legislative enactments). 
15 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)); see also Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 
65, 78 (1999) (rejecting the judicial “superlegislature” role); Exxon Corp. v. Governor 
of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1978) (paying deference to Maryland state statute); North 
Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. 414 U.S. 156, 165 (1973) 
(“We refuse to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation[.]” (quoting 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963))). 
16 Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313. 
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further legislative response.17  The courts in such cases also do not 
typically insist on any articulation by the legislature of its reasons, 
purposes, or aims in enacting a statute.18  Nor need the legislature 
typically offer any findings of fact to explain or to justify, as of the 
time of its enactment,19 the statute in question.20  The courts seek 
to justify this broad deference to legislative action in part based on 
the belief that “absent some reason to infer antipathy, even 
improvident [legislative] decisions will eventually be rectified  
by the democratic process . . . .”21  A basic problem with this 
optimistic belief, however, is that statutes and regulations which 
utterly fail to serve any of their supposed public purposes—or 
which actually make the perceived social problem worse—may be 
quite stable and difficult to politically reverse if the policy 
distinctly benefits some small and well-organized groups.22 
This typical judicial reluctance to question whether a statute 
or rule somehow advances one or more of its presumed purposes, 
even after the statute or rule has been fully implemented and its 
actual results can be readily investigated, is certainly not confined 
to the equal protection context.  The actual results of a challenged 
government policy are also deemed largely irrelevant in,  
for example, eminent domain cases.23  It has also been argued, 
however ironically, that this broad judicial deference to 
legislatures whenever basic constitutional rights are not at stake 
“provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is 
 
17 See id. at 316; Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
18 See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 
1, 15 (1992). 
19 It is, for our purposes, important that the cases focus almost entirely on the 
justifiability of the statute at the time of legislative deliberation and enactment, 
rather than on any degree of effectiveness of the statute post-enactment, after its 
implementation, and thus in actual practice. 
20 See, e.g., Beach Commc’ns. Inc, 508 U.S. at 315; Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 15; 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979). 
21 Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. at 314 (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
22 As classically argued in MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 
(2012); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 17 (1982); GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 185 (Charles Rowley ed. 2005); and in 
summary form in William F. Shughart, II, Public Choice, ECONLIB, https://www.econ 
lib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (last visited Sep. 14, 2019).  
23 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544–45 (2005); Kelo v. City 
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–89 (2005) (focusing on merely predictive, ex ante, 
preimplementation, prospective judgments by the public officials involved); Haw. 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984). 
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entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass.”24  It is, however, 
unfortunately quite unclear how broad judicial deference to 
legislatures in social and economic matters provides either 
concrete “guidance”25 or meaningful “discipline”26 for legislatures.  
One might well say, in the alternative, that judicial deference 
commonly authorizes legislative or administrative action even 
where that action can be shown to have failed in practice to 
substantially advance any of its inferable purposes. 
In some cases, fully appropriate post-enactment judicial 
redress to injured parties may not be possible, even if it is now 
clear that the policy is a complete failure.  Even if a court officially 
declared the failure of, say, the eminent domain scheme in Kelo v. 
City of New London,27 it might not be feasible to reconstruct the 
vanished homes and properties, let alone an entire community.28  
But in most cases, some sort of creative judicial relief, in terms of 
a carefully crafted injunction, monetary damages, or declaratory 
relief, should be available to reduce the otherwise accumulating 
private and public harms of evidently failed policies.  Legislative 
and administrative policies that have failed to substantially  
or otherwise meaningfully advance any plausible public  
purpose should thus be considered vulnerable to appropriate  
judicial redress. 
Perhaps the idea of judicially requiring merely a “realistically 
conceivable”29 legislative public interest fairly expresses a single 
uniform, less readily manipulable judicial review standard around 
which courts should rally.  Often, the legislative purposes sought 
by a piece of legislation or rule will not be clear.30  But we need not 
 
24 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 545 U.S. at 487–88. The development project in question metaphorically 
collapsed. See Susette Kelo, I Still Feel the Pain of Losing My ‘Little Pink House,’  
USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/ 
04/16/private-land-seizure-pfizer-new-london-little-pink-house-column/507608002/; 
Ilya Somin, Give Susette Kelo Her Land Back, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(May 25, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://reason.com/2018/05/25/give-susette-kelo-back- 
her-land/. 
28 But see Somin, supra note 27, for a constructive remedial suggestion in that 
specific context. 
29 As adopted in Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 
2004) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied sub nom Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. 
Iowa, 541 U.S. 1086 (2004); Horsfield Materials, Inc., v. City of Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 
444, 459 (Iowa 2013) (citation and internal quotation omitted).  
30 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972) (“The legislative purposes that 
the statute is meant to serve are not altogether clear.”). The plurality in Eisenstadt 
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insist on evidence in legislative history that one or more legislators 
consciously endorsed any particular purpose at the time of 
legislative enactment.31  Ascertaining any specific statutory intent 
is, of course, often problematic.32  Even if a contemporaneous 
legislative intent could be determined, though, it might also be 
sensible to consider post-enactment grounds and justifications.33  
More radically, courts might begin to insist broadly upon at least 
minimal legislative statements of intended legislative purpose. 
A further complication is that any statute might well have  
a number of purposes, whether those multiple purposes are 
specified, ranked, or neither.34  As well, the legislative purposes at 
issue may be of somewhat different sorts.  Statutes may differ in 
their emphasis on substantive purposes,35 as supposedly distinct 
from what we might call symbolic,36 expressive,37 or public 
identity-related, purposes.38  In some cases, a government policy 
 
evidently found the likely dubious future effectiveness of the contraceptive restriction 
to be evidence that certain specified purposes could not plausibly be ascribed to the 
enacting legislature. See id. at 442–43. 
31 See, e.g., Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 560 (5th  
Cir. 2006). 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 560–61. Not all unforeseen consequences of a statute need be adverse, 
after all. Consider a tree planting program intended solely to promote local aesthetics 
that also turns out to promote a healthier local environment and even local  
business activity. 
34 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466–70 (1981); 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981). Consider, as well, the possible 
multiple purposes of governmental affirmative action programs, as elaborated in R. 
George Wright, Cumulative Case Arguments and the Justification of Academic 
Affirmative Action, 23 PACE L. REV. 1, 12–14, 19 (2002). It is also certainly possible 
that the multiple legislative purposes may be, to one degree or another, in conflict.  
35 A statute aimed at, say, flood control or infrastructure enhancement, will 
typically have mostly substantive purposes. 
36 For background, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 1–2 
(2d ed. 1985). Perhaps every significant statute, though, has some element of symbolic 
or expressive intent, whether the courts recognize this or not. Thus, it may be a 
mistake to view, say, teenage video game anti-pornography ordinances as intended 
solely to reduce some tangible, material harm, such as violent crime. But see Brown 
v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–801 (2011) (focusing largely on evidence of 
some form of aggressiveness, or the lack thereof, apart from any more symbolic or 
expressive purposes). 
37 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2021, 2021–23 (1996). 
38 Identity-establishing or identity-confirming legislation, as perhaps in the case 
of immigration policy, can be motivated by a sense of “who we are,” which is 
understood largely as a matter of who we presumably should be. Jamshed Dastur, 
This Is Not Who We Are as Americans. Or Is It?, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 5, 2018),  
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may involve an inseparable mixture of the substantive and the 
nonsubstantive purposes.39  We can accept any reasonable account 
of the nature of the purposes associated with a rule or statute. 
Our primary concern, though, is not with the nature of the 
interests cited in support of a given policy, but with whether any 
such policy is, in practice, substantially advanced after its 
implementation.  Relatively narrow questions of whether there 
has been substantial advancement of a given legislative purpose 
can still, admittedly, be politicized to some limited degree.  But 
such questions are less readily, less broadly, and less 
uninhibitedly manipulable by judges than the typically more 
complex and multifaceted, if not largely arbitrary, inquiries as to 
tailoring and the other dimensions of tiered scrutiny judgments.   
Also, a court that adopts, in advance, even a general test for 
determining the substantial versus insubstantial advancement of 
a legislative policy is thereby more constrained by that simple test 
than by typical forms of tiered scrutiny.  And crucially, a judicial 
inquiry into the substantial advancement of a legislative purpose 
as merely a binary inquiry renders any further judicial concern 
about degrees of advancement of a legislative purpose utterly 
irrelevant.  In classical tiers of scrutiny analysis, the court may 
use an indefinite, if not infinite, number of degrees of purpose 
fulfillment, importance of legislative purpose, and tailoring. 
As it turns out, courts sometimes do require evidence, largely 
or entirely pre-implementation, that a policy will have some 
meaningful impact on the presumed social evil in question.  In 
general, the greater the significance of constitutional-level 
considerations in a case, the greater the chances that a court will 
probe the predicted likelihood that a legislative policy will have 
some desired future effect. 
 
 
https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/opinion/tn-dpt-me-commentary-america-
20180705-story.html. The contrast would be with the familiar claim that some 
unattractive phenomenon “is not who we are.” Id. 
39 Consider the local downtown Christmas display policy litigated in the 
Establishment Clause case of Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984). One 
could easily argue that the combined religious and secular elements of the seasonal 
display had various purposes ranging from the purely commercial—to enhance local 
downtown spending—to promoting civic and community pride, to the generally 
celebratory, to symbolic, expressive, and local identity-confirming purposes, and then 
to religious preference, favoritism, and advancement. It is even possible that the most 
purely commercial motivations could not be optimized over time without the presence 
of at least some perceivably religious symbols. See id. at 680–84. 
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Judicial inquiries into the substantiality of the advancement 
of a purported government interest arise, in particular, in the 
dormant commerce clause cases.  Among the familiar dormant 
commerce clause cases, for example, we find judicial scrutiny of a 
state statute’s likely future effects, as distinct from actual current 
effects, in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation,40 Hunt 
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,41 and 
Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona.42  Typically, this judicial 
inquiry into a state statute’s likely future effects then triggers  
a largely unconstrained judicial balancing test,43 with the  
assumed value of the state regulatory interest being somehow  
weighed against the likely future adverse effects on the flow of 
interstate commerce.44 
The language of these dormant commerce clause cases 
legitimizes a general judicial inquiry into the extent of a state 
policy’s advancement.  Judicial balancing then often follows.  
Thus, “Regulations . . . may further the purpose so marginally and 
interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under 
the Commerce Clause.”45  A challenged state statute may 
predictably do “remarkably little”46 to further the abstractly 
permissible state interest and thus fail a generalized interest 
balancing test.47  Even if only through prediction, courts thus 
consider the likely effectiveness of the policy. 
In cases moving toward the realm of individual federal 
constitutional rights, the courts again tend to inquire, usually 
predictively, into the fulfillment of the state regulatory purposes.  
Thus in the commercial speech area, cases such as Central Hudson 
Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission,48 
 
40 450 U.S. 662, 670–71, 674–75, 677–78 (1981). 
41 432 U.S. 333, 350–54 (1977), superseded in part by statute 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(1), as recognized in United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 
v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 556–57 (1996). 
42 325 U.S. 761, 781–82 (1945). 
43 See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670–71; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; S. Pacific Co., 325 
U.S. at 775–76. 
44 See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670–71; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53; S. Pacific Co., 325 
U.S. at 775–76. 
45 Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670. 
46 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353. 
47 See, e.g., S. Pacific Co., 325 U.S. at 775–76. For an example of a much less 
critical and more deferential judicial approach to the likely promotion of state 
statutory interests in the dormant commerce clause context, see generally the local 
baitfish case of Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
48 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
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Edenfield v. Fane,49 and 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island50 
allow for judicial inquiry into whether a regulation “provides only 
ineffective or remote support,”51 for the government regulatory 
interest at stake,52 or into whether the regulation “will in fact 
alleviate [the targeted social harm] to a material degree.”53  The 
court may thus require evidence of a future significant advance of 
the government interest.54  In these and other areas,55 the courts 
may in some instances56 require predictive evidence that the 
government policy at issue will substantially advance a cognizable 
government purpose. 
Remarkably, some courts impose a similar predictive 
standard, but under the grossly misleading rubric of a “tailoring” 
inquiry.57  In these cases, the court’s assessment of the future 
degree of success of the policy occurs, as in tiered scrutiny analysis, 
through a judicial inquiry into the required degree of “tailoring” of 
the state regulatory policy. 
This odd judicial confusion of supposed policy effectiveness 
with the supposed degree to which the regulation is tailored to its 
target—and thereby to one supposed degree or another 
overinclusive or underinclusive—occurs in various important 
 
49 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993). 
50 517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996). 
51 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. It is not entirely clear  
why support that is “remote” should be entirely discounted, in contrast with  
“direct” support. 
52 See id. 
53 Edenfield, 505 U.S. at 771. 
54 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505. For recent applications of a similar 
requirement of a predicted alleviation of the targeted social harm to some material 
degree, see, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra, 878 F.3d 1165, 1177 (9th Cir. 2018); 
Missouri Broads. Ass’n v. Lacy, 846 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2017); Kiser v. Kamdar, 
831 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2016). 
55 See, e.g.,  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (regarding constitutional 
standing). Allen required the plaintiffs, at an early stage of the lawsuit, to show a 
stronger likelihood that the sought-after change in IRS enforcement policy would 
make a relevant and appreciable difference with respect to the plaintiffs’ interests. 
See id. at 758. 
56 But see, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148, 151–52 (1986), and in the 
judicial standing area, the more accommodating mood in United States v. SCRAP, 412 
U.S. 669, 683–90 (1973). See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 
456, 466–68 (1981) (on the equal protection issue, but also more generally, disclaiming 
any concern for any likely future impact of the statute in practice, as distinct  
from merely whether the legislature “could rationally have decided that its ban on  
plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally  
desirable alternatives”). This is clearly a more deferential, less inquisitorial, more 
backward-looking judicial standard. 
57 For a sense of the basic confusion, see supra text accompanying note 7.  
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contexts.  These contexts include equal protection,58 commercial 
speech,59 and due process.60  The judicial confusion of tailoring with 
questions of the policy’s impact can manifest in two ways.  First, 
questions of policy tailoring can be confused with questions of the 
severity, inescapability, or weight of the policy’s burden on any 
affected party, whether that burden was legislatively intended  
or not.  And second, questions of the policy’s tailoring may be 
confused with questions of the policy’s effectiveness or the 
practical purpose-fulfilling impact of the policy. 
These judicial confusions are understandable as long as the 
courts insist on addressing many constitutional problems through 
one form or another of tiered scrutiny.  Tiered scrutiny, after all, 
normally involves an inquiry, first into the existence of a 
governmental interest, and, second into the policy’s degree of 
tailoring or fit.61  But crucially, these two inquiries tell us very 
little about whether the policy is actually effective in practice or 
about the real and inescapable severity of its constitutional impact 
on any party. 
Tiered scrutiny, in its most typical forms,62 thus largely 
misses crucially important concerns.  Often, we will want to know 
whether a burdensome policy is effective, is largely ineffective, or 
else amounts to a classic backfire that makes the initial problem 
worse.63  There will likely be some public pressure for courts  
 
58 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (“The search for the link 
between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . [b]y requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an 
independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not 
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”). 
59 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1993) 
(discussing trivial, “minute,” or “paltry” effect of the commercial speech regulation on 
the perceived social problem as supposedly a matter of tailoring, or “the ‘fit’ between 
the city’s goal and its method of achieving it”). 
60 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (requiring, in the context of 
limiting classic economic substantive due process, that “the [regulatory] means 
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained”). 
61 For systematic and historical accounts of the development of tiered scrutiny, 
see Wright, supra note 1, at 169; White, supra note 2, at 65–80. 
62 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986). In a 
very limited class of cases, the courts may apparently ignore matters of tailoring or fit 
and focus instead on questions of any alternative courses of action that may remain 
available to a plaintiff affected by a policy.  
63 See Prashant Bharadwaj, Leah K. Lakdawala & Nicholas Li, Perverse 
Consequences of Well Intentioned Regulation: Evidence From India’s Child Labor Ban 
1, 1 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 2013 (discussing the problem of policy measures 
with perverse unintended consequences); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse  
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to consider such an obviously practical question, even if the  
tiered scrutiny interest and tailoring inquiries do not call for  
such consideration.  And we will often want to know not merely 
whether a party is unintentionally affected by a policy, but the 
constitutional severity or weight of that effect, as well as whether 
the unintentionally affected party could realistically avoid the 
adverse effect at minimal constitutional value and financial cost.64  
Tiered scrutiny typically does not inquire into any of this. 
More broadly, applications of tiered scrutiny do not naturally 
lend themselves to inquiring into a variety of practically crucial 
matters.  The degree of importance of a government interest does 
not tell us whether the policy actually promotes that interest, 
substantially or otherwise.  And tailoring inquires do not naturally 
measure the actual, constitutional, or practical impact of the policy 
on any affected party.65  Degrees of tailoring, fit, overlap, and 
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness are, oddly, potentially 
infinite in distinguishing among the relevant degrees and are also 
merely two-dimensional.  They can be fairly represented through 
a variety of merely two-dimensional Venn diagrams.66  But the 
degree of effectiveness of a policy, in practice, or the severity of its 
impact, is unavoidably three-dimensional.  Tiered scrutiny does 
not typically address these vital matters. 
We might, by imperfect analogy, think of the case of a meteor 
impacting the earth.  We will, in the aftermath, certainly want to 
know about the two-dimensional scope or the geographic surface 
area scope, coverage, or breadth of the meteor impact.  But we will 
also want to know about the three-dimensional matter of how 
superficial, or how deep or severe, the impact of the meteor turned 
out to be.  But this analogy actually understates the problem for 
tiered scrutiny.  In matters of the law, we will often care at least 
as much about the severity or weight of a burden on constitutional 
rights as we do about the scope of the persons who are affected, 
perhaps only trivially, thereby.  In the law, some “meteor impacts” 
are minimal, trivial, or readily avoidable at low cost. 
 
Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 167 (2017). 
More controversially, consider the conflicting assessments of the long-term effects of 
typical rent control regulation. See infra notes 83 & 129 and accompanying text. 
64 See Unnecessary Complexity, supra note 7, at 77. This inquiry is thus not merely 
into degrees of unintended burdening, but into the availability, the monetary and 
constitutional value costs, and the value of escape mechanisms for the adversely 
affected party. See id. 
65 See id. at 73. 
66 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
2019] WIPING AWAY THE TIERS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 1131 
Typically, tiered scrutiny analysis thus misses out on this 
important third dimension of actual impact, except when the 
scrutiny analysis is confusedly expanded to somehow take depth 
of impact or of policy fulfilment into account.  Courts sometimes 
do consider the actual impact of a policy when the stakes are at 
their highest, in the course of applying either strict67 or some forms 
of “exacting” or proportionate scrutiny.68  In these heightened 
scrutiny cases, the court may seek to do a balancing of rights, 
interests, benefits, or harms at stake, and then inquire, however 
subjectively, into whether the policy is sufficiently tailored to the 
government interest in question.69  For our purposes, the problems 
with proliferating varieties of strict, exacting, and proportionate 
tailoring are again their sheer manipulability and the lack of 
meaningful constraint on the courts.70  Even in cases in which 
constitutionally fundamental rights or constitutionally suspect 
classifications are involved, courts tend to focus on readily 
manipulable inquiries into the sufficiency of the legislative 
tailoring.71  When constitutionally fundamental rights are at 
stake, basic rule of law values instead require less judicial 
manipulability and greater predictability of outcomes. 
Basic rule of law values suggest that cases involving 
constitutionally fundamental rights, in particular, should  
not be addressed primarily through any familiar form of 
readily-manipulable tiered scrutiny.  Matters such as the 
judicially-perceived weight of the governmental regulatory 
 
67 From among the wide range of strict scrutiny cases, see, e.g., Adarand 
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229, 236 (1995) (racial affirmative action 
and equal protection); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418–21 (1989) (flag burning as 
protected speech). For some fundamental complications, however, see generally R. 
George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 759, 777–79 (2012). 
68 The meaning of “exacting scrutiny” is currently unclear. See Wright, supra note 
10, at 207. But a sense of the intuitive balancing and proportionalism often involved 
therein is evident in cases such as United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012), and 
in particular Justices Breyer and Kagan’s opinion, id. at 730–39 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
69 For background on the complications of narrow tailoring, see generally R. 
George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What They 
Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67 (1997). 
70 See supra notes 67–69; see also R. George Wright, Content-Based and 
Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 336 (2006). 
71 See, e.g., the comparative emphasis in the law school admissions case of Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308–09 (2003) and the undergraduate admissions case of 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246–47 (2003). 
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interest, the perceived degree of tailoring, and the extent to which 
the government interest is actually being advanced should be 
subordinated when genuinely fundamental rights are at stake.  A 
genuinely fundamental right should not be subject, in particular, 
to broad judicial weighing, balancing, or proportionality 
inquiries,72 with the fundamental constitutional rights perhaps 
being unpredictably balanced away.73 
In this particular class of cases, the courts should either 
require the government to pursue its interest without 
substantially burdening the constitutionally fundamental right at 
stake74 or establish that the right does not genuinely qualify as 
fundamental.75  In an extreme case, a government with no other 
viable options might choose to substantially violate the genuinely 
fundamental right, mitigating the harm if possible, and then 
paying full and appropriate damages.76  Tiered judicial scrutiny of 
a purportedly rigorous sort is also applied in cases where no 
constitutionally fundamental right is in jeopardy, but where some 
sort of suspect or historically dubious legislative classification is 
at stake.77  The question here becomes how to reform tiered 
 
72 Proportionality inquiries into supposedly fundamental rights are increasingly 
common. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Proportionality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12–14 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 
2012); Luc B. Tremblay, An Egalitarian Defense of Proportionality-Based Balancing, 
12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 864, 865 (2014); Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing 
and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 134 (2003).  
73 This argument is classically made in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 198–99 (1977). 
74 This would not require any kind of tailoring. The requirement would simply be 
that the government policy not violate the fundamental right, with no further 
requirement of narrow or any other form of tailoring imposed on any government 
policy that does not also violate a constitutionally fundamental right. 
75 We need take no position on what in particular should count as a 
constitutionally fundamental right, as distinct from, say, a mere liberty interest, or 
on how to determine such questions. We can accept any reasonable approach thereto. 
For background and a sense of the ongoing contest, see, for example, Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–50 (1968) (on fundamentality for due process 
incorporation purposes); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24 (1989) (on the 
respective roles of history and tradition as distinct from emerging insights); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–11 (1997) (emphasizing consensual 
recognition over time); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (declining to 
be bound by history and tradition); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 
(2015) (also declining to be bound by history and tradition). 
76 This option can accommodate cases in which the broader public interest in the 
enforcement of the policy is itself of inescapably crucial importance. 
77 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (explicit race 
discrimination as requiring strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209–10 
(1976) (explicit gender discrimination as requiring intermediate scrutiny). 
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scrutiny when no fundamental constitutional right is at stake,  
but where the policy is intended to distinguish among persons  
on suspect grounds or where it refers explicitly to suspect 
classifications in distributing burdens and benefits.78 
For the sake of simplicity, reduced scope for uncertainty, 
reduced manipulability, and other rule of law values, it would be 
ideal to remove suspect classification cases from the scope of tiered 
scrutiny analysis.  Doing so would clearly come at some cost to 
some plaintiffs.  But importantly, the most egregious suspect 
classification cases will already be accommodated by strong 
protection of constitutionally fundamental rights.79  That is, one 
might reasonably judge a policy that is evidently intended to 
invidiously discriminate against an identifiable class to thereby 
violate a constitutionally fundamental right of that class.80  Both 
material and dignitary concerns suggest that such invidious 
classifications are often likely to burden constitutionally 
fundamental rights.  This category might even include some rare 
instances of benignly-intended policies that affect traditionally 
subordinated groups.81 
Overall, then, we need something different than our current 
complex and readily manipulable system of tiered judicial 
scrutiny.  And in minimizing plainly crucial issues of whether a 
given policy actually, and not merely predictively, has any 
substantial or otherwise meaningful impact on any social problem, 
the tiered scrutiny system is often unpragmatic, unrealistic, 
wasteful, and imprudent in operation. 
In contrast, a judicial approach that avoids tiers of scrutiny 
could validate constitutionally fundamental rights without any 
manipulable inquiry into tailoring.  The focus would be instead on 
a less micromanipulable inquiry into whether the policy has 
substantially or otherwise meaningfully advanced a cognizable 
public interest.  On this suggested approach, degrees of tailoring,  
 
 
78 Thus, not every adverse impact on suspect classification grounds evokes 
heightened scrutiny; proof of intent to discriminate, or at least an explicit reference to 
a suspect classification, must also be shown. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 242 (1976) (racial public hiring case in absence of discriminatory intent applying 
less than strict scrutiny). 
79 See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
80 For some of the possible approaches to reaching this result, see the cases cited 
supra note 75. 
81 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 343 (2003) (law school racial 
affirmative action). 
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among other considerations, would generally not matter.  We now 
turn to the question of how this form of judicial review could 
operate, with an enhancement of pragmatic and rule of law values. 
II. SUBSTANTIAL ACTUAL ADVANCEMENT OF A  
COGNIZABLE PUBLIC PURPOSE 
Any replacement for the tiers of scrutiny, especially where 
fundamental constitutional rights are not at stake, should 
recognize the sheer waste and inefficiency that is currently 
encouraged by traditional minimum scrutiny review.  The tiered 
scrutiny cases normally involve judicial deference even to 
minimally plausible, if not merely conceivable legislative 
predictions as to the consequences of their legislation in practice.82  
But legislation, no less than life itself, is rife with important 
unanticipated consequences.83 
In certain contexts, courts have sometimes acknowledged the 
gulf between intended and actual policy consequences.  Thus, 
courts in administrative cases have recognized the difference 
between an agency’s best guess as to a commodity price a year  
into the future and the agency’s simple and uncontroversial 
recognition of the actual price a year later.84  Later and fuller 
information incorporating lived experience tends to be especially 
valuable for useful decision-making.85  Actual implementation and 
enforcement may generate crucial new information.86  This new 
information may expose prior information gaps, fallacies, basic 
misunderstandings, failures of the legislative imagination, and 
the magnitude of legislative cognitive biases.87  In some instances, 
 
82 See supra Part I. For a representative case, see, for example, Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery, Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981). 
83 See, for example, Bharadwaj et al., supra note 63; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 
63, as well as, classically, Frederic Bastiat, That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is 
Not Seen (1850), https://bastiat.org/en/twistatwins.html; Robert K. Merton, The 
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894,  
895 (1936). More particularly, see J.P. Mangalindan, California Privacy Law Will 
Have ‘Unintended Consequences’: Google, YAHOO FIN. (Jul. 1, 2018), https://finance. 
yahoo.com/news/california-privacy-law-will-unintended-consequences-google-121038 
199.html. 
84 See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370,  
390 (1932). 
85 See generally id.; see also Richard Morgenstern, Retrospective Analysis of U.S. 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 9 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 285, 287 (2018). 
86 See Morgenstern, supra note 85, at 287. 
87 See Morgenstern, supra note 85, at 287. See generally How to Reduce Bias in 
Decision Making: A Part of the Comprehensive and Fully Integrated Framework for 
Critical Thinking at the USC Marshall School of Business, USC MARSHALL CRITICAL 
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courts have encouraged, if not required, administrative agencies 
to revise their own rules based on the admitted differences 
between an agency’s initial expectations and its later experiences 
with the rule in actual practice.88  Courts often grant significant 
latitude to administrative agency rules that are presumably 
seeking to promote statutory goals.89  Initially, an agency’s largely 
predictive judgment may suffice to justify an administrative rule.90  
But at some point, accumulated experience with the actual 
consequences of agency rules should trump an agency’s mere 
initial predictions.91  An agency may thus sometimes be under a 
“duty”92 to reassess and revise its own rules if the rules do not 
“actually produce the benefits the [agency] originally predicted 
they would.”93  A sensible pragmatism requires attention to actual, 
as well as  predicted, consequences of fallible administrative 
agency judgments.  Any other course merely sustains and 
compounds initial policy mistakes.  A judicial failure to assess new 
and crucial experience in a litigated case may unfortunately reflect 
the sunk cost fallacy,94 a status quo bias,95 institutional role 
misunderstandings, or some other generally wasteful tendency. 
It should be difficult to argue against the logic of greater 
judicial attention to actual consequences of policies, as distinct 
from fallible—and perhaps biased and self-serving—initial 
predictions of consequences.  Following through on this pragmatic 
logic, however, coheres with our proposed requirement that  
 
 
THINKING INITIATIVE 1, 4 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019), http://info.marshall.usc.edu/ 
faculty/critthink/Supplemental%20Material/Reducing%20Bias.pdf (listing and briefly 
describing some of the most common and legislatively relevant decision-making 
biases). See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982). 
88 See Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Syracuse Peace Council 
v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659–60 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export-Import 
Bank, 85 F. Supp. 3d 387, 418 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). 
89 See the statutory term interpretation case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944), along with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
90 See, e.g., Bechtel, 957 F.2d at 881; Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 660. 
91 See Bechtel, 957 F.2d at 881. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 The sunk cost fallacy can involve compounding an investment in what has 
recently been discovered to have been a bad or inaccurate choice. See Jamie 
Ducharme, The Sunk Cost Fallacy Is Ruining Your Decisions. Here’s How, TIME (July 
26, 2018), https://time.com/5347133/sunk-cost-fallacy-decisions/.   
95 Status quo bias can be seen even when the costs, in this case to agencies and 
courts in particular, are low compared to the relatively high broader stakes. See 
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1989). 
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evidence that the challenged policy has substantially or otherwise 
meaningfully advanced at least one cognizable public policy 
interest in practice be proferred.96  
The idea of “substantiality,” and in particular of 
“substantially” advancing an interest, is already familiar to us 
from substantive due process97 and various other doctrines.98  
Similarly, the idea of “substantially” burdening a right or interest 
is familiar from various areas of the law.99  In these cases, the idea 
of a “substantial” advance is what is known to philosophers as  
a “thick” concept,100 in that it unavoidably partakes of both 
descriptive and evaluative components.101  We need not here 
recommend any particular understanding, whether narrow or 
broad, rigorous or lax, of what constitutes a “substantial” advance 
of an interest.  There would be little sense in attempting to guess 
in advance how to specify a concept when the point is, in part, to 
encourage greater attention to how legislative intentions work out 
 
96 Our focus on actual, as opposed to merely predicted or hoped-for, advance of a 
cognizable interest borrows from and contributes to discussions of the proper role of 
the doctrine of the ripeness of a case for adjudication. In the administrative law 
context, there is a recurring issue as to whether a court should proceed to the merits 
of a challenge to a rule or should instead wait until further information about the 
actual impact of a rule, as felt in practice, has become available. Waiting for 
post-implementation evidence was deemed unnecessary in the largely purely legal 
case of Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). But in contrast, the Court 
insisted upon waiting for later-accruing, concrete evidence of a rule’s effect in practice 
in Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003) (citing Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978)). Our approach, in 
mostly non-administrative contexts, understandably favors those challengers who, in 
the absence of any fundamental right claim, can point to the failure of a policy, in 
practice, on its own terms. 
97 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–45 (2005) 
(addressing the idea of “substantially advanc[ing]” a proffered state interest in 
substantive due process cases, if not also in regulatory takings cases). 
98 See, for example, the commercial speech case of Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 
S. Ct. 1656, 1678-79 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing recent free speech case law). 
99 For background, see generally R. George Wright, Substantial Burdens in the 
Law, 46 SW. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
100 See, e.g., THICK CONCEPTS (Simon Kirchin ed. 2013); BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140–42, 150–52 (1985). For clarity, one can 
more easily think of ideas such as courage and cowardice as involving both description 
of the actions in question and an assessment of their value or worthiness. Importantly, 
in typical cases, assessments of courage and cowardice as “thick concepts” do not 
especially lend themselves to manipulation. One could, in theory, refer to successfully 
landing a damaged passenger plane on a river as “cowardly.” And one could, in theory, 
refer to abandoning one’s family, in the face of a significant risk for some modest 
payoff, as “courageous.” But these concepts are not as generally manipulable as those 
involved in tiered scrutiny. 
101 See supra note 100. 
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in actual practice.  Our recommendation thus would be that courts 
should initially feel free to explore the practical consequences of 
various approaches to what should count as a “substantial” 
advance of a public interest. 
After experimentation and reflection, the courts within a 
given jurisdiction should ideally coordinate in adopting, as far as 
possible, a uniform approach to the idea of substantiality, as in 
substantial advance.  This freely adopted and experientially 
grounded judicial uniformity would then serve rule of law values 
including simplicity, predictability, and justifiable constraint on 
judicial discretion.  The idea here is again that it would be 
especially difficult for judges to game a specified idea of 
substantiality than it is to game even one of the dimensions of 
tiered scrutiny in such a way as to steer the outcome of a 
controversial case.  There is certainly greater likelihood of a 
judicial consensus on the idea of “substantially” advancing an 
interest than on how the application of the tiers of scrutiny should 
be applied in given cases. 
A similar approach should be applied to any significant 
differences among courts, at least within a given jurisdiction, as to 
how the courts should ascertain which possible governmental 
interests should be taken into account in a given case.  Of course, 
the courts already face serious problems in determining the scope 
of cognizable interests, purposes, and goals associated with a given 
piece of legislation.102  Legislative intent, whether actual or merely 
conceivable, may be obscure, divided, murky, self-contradictory, 
and perhaps self-serving.103  The value of isolated or even 
post-enactment statements of legislative purpose is always 
debatable.104  Our approach in this respect is again not to resolve 
such perennial issues on the merits here.  The point is, for the sake 
of pragmatic and rule of law values, to encourage courts  
to voluntarily pursue increasing uniformity in ascertaining 
 
102 For a recent survey of this inescapable general problem, see generally John F. 
Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397 (2017); 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
863 (1930); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 371 (1987).  
103 See generally Manning, supra note 102, at 2400; Starr, supra note 102, at 375; 
Posner, supra note 102; Radin, supra note 102, at 872. 
104 For a useful discussion of particular approaches to determining cognizable 
statutory purposes, see Vill. of Arlington Heights. v. Metro Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 
266–69 (1977). 
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legislative interests and purposes.  Again, the scope of judicially 
cognizable government purposes associated with a statute may 
always be controversial to some degree, but the questions involved 
do not match any obvious political or ideological divide.  It seems 
fair to say that political and ideological commitments do not 
typically steer judges towards any consistent theory as to how to 
ascertain the actual purposes of typical statutes or administrative 
regulations.  Legislative purposes can, on our approach, be 
somehow ascertained and then judged in individual cases to have 
been substantially advanced, in practice, with reduced 
opportunities for case-by-case judicial manipulation on political or 
ideological grounds. 
It would certainly be useful, though, to have some tentative 
sense of how judicially requiring the substantial advancement of a 
cognizable public legislative purpose might work.  In this regard, 
courts can draw upon the experiences now emerging from the 
administrative agency practice of what is called retrospective or 
“look-back” review.105  An administrative agency’s retrospective 
 
105 For discussions of retrospective review of an agency’s rules in the United 
States and internationally, see, for example, Joseph E. Aldy, Learning From 
Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the 
Evidence For Improving the Design and Implementation of Regulatory Policy,  
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES 8–64 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.acus.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro%2520Review%2520Draft%252011-17-
2014.pdf; Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating the 
Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Reform, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 7 (August 2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [hereinafter Measuring]; Cary Coglianese, Moving 
Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. REG. 57, 58–59 (2013) [hereinafter 
Moving Forward]; Maureen Cropper, Arthur Fraas & Richard Morgenstern,  
Looking Backward to Move Regulations Forward, 355 SCIENCE 1375, 1375 (Mar. 31, 
2017); HM TREASURY, THE MAGENTA BOOK: GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION 5 (Apr. 
2011), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/220542/magenta_book_combined.pdf; Sofie E. Miller, Learning 
from Experience: Retrospective Review of Regulations in 2014, at 16–18  
(Nov. 2015) (working paper on file with the George Washington University  
Regulatory Studies Center), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/ 
files/zaxdzs1866/f/Retrospective%20Review%20in%202014_MillerS_11_3.pdf; 
Richard Morgenstern, Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 9 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 285, 296–300 (2018); Connor Raso, Assessing 
Regulatory Retrospective Review Under the Obama Administration, BROOKINGS (Jun. 
15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/assessing-regulatory; Regulatory 
Impact Analysis: A Tool for Policy Coherence, OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A 
Tool for Policy Coherence (2009), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-
impact-analysis_9789264067110-en#page1; Retrospective Review of Agency Rules, 
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. (Dec. 9, 2014), www.acus.gov/recommendation/ 
retrospective-review-agency-rules; Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (2014); Jonathan Wiener & Daniel L. Ribiero, Environmental 
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review of an agency’s current rules is typically conducted by the 
agency itself and thus often involves no cross-branch 
interaction.106  Therefore, the guidance for the courts from  
the current practice of retrospective review is indirect and  
merely suggestive.  But looking to the overall experience  
with retrospective agency review of administrative rules can 
nonetheless provide useful insights for courts reviewing statutes 
and rules. 
Retrospective review experience, for example, indicates that a 
regulation—and by obvious implication, a statute—can be in some 
respect effective, or merely ineffective, but may also completely 
backfire107 by making the perceived social problem worse than it 
might otherwise have been.108  Rules and statutes can also initially 
be harmless or even beneficial in some respects but then  
become antiquated and obsolete.109  Retrospective administrative  
agency review can also add to our understanding of how 
later-arriving information can dramatically improve upon initial 
perceptions and understandings that were formulated on largely 
speculative grounds.110 
Importantly, studies of retrospective agency review, and in 
particular of the typical agency reluctance to undertake such 
review, illustrate the crucial need for other institutions to take up 
the review process where an agency or legislature is disinclined to 
 
Regulation Going Retro: Learning Foresight from Hindsight, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 1, 21–22 (2016). For a sense of some agency incentives toward something akin to 
retrospective review as more formally understood, see Wendy Wagner, et al., Dynamic 
Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 216–20 (2017). For discussion of a possible 
congressionally mandated judicial review of an agency’s preenactment regulatory 
impact analysis, see Reeve Bull & Jerry Ellig, Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact 
Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 759–61 (2017). 
106 See supra note 105. 
107 See Moving Forward, supra note 105, at 57. 
108 See Bharadwaj et. al, supra note 63, at 1; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 63, at 
167; Bastiat, supra note 83, at 2; Merton, supra note 83, at 894; Mangalindan, supra 
note 83, at 1; see also PETER M. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN 34–35 
(2014) (“[C]ampaign finance regulation, which its advocates claimed would ‘take the 
money out of politics,’ has done pretty much the opposite . . . .”). 
109 See Moving Forward, supra note 105, at 57–58; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2–3 (Harvard Univ. Press Ed. 2009) (on the 
possible mechanics of addressing perceived statutory obsolescence). 
110 See Morgenstern, supra note 105, at 287 (explaining that while information on 
ex post circumstances is likely to be imperfect, our post-enactment understanding of 
the actual effects of a policy are clearly likely to be much more accurate than our 
understanding at the time of the enactment of a policy). For a judicial recognition of 
this phenomenon, see Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 
370, 389–90 (1932).  
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do so.111  Agencies and legislatures may both reasonably believe 
that focusing on trending issues may score more political points 
than reexamining previously adopted rules or legislation.112  There 
is, after all, a serious risk that previously adopted rules and 
legislation may be found to be ineffective, or even perverse, with 
respect to their touted purposes.113  This could well involve 
awkward admissions.  One obvious response to these incentives is 
to have other governmental entities, including the courts, 
legitimately assume increased initiative and responsibility.114 
Agencies may thus shy away from serious retrospective 
analysis, even when formally required by statute to plan for and 
undertake such reviews.115  The rewards to an agency, or to 
legislators, from showing116 that its adopted policies indeed had 
some already anticipated, publicized, and desired effect may be 
outweighed by a showing117 that the policy did not in fact 
meaningfully contribute toward any recognized public purpose.  
Thus, even an inexpert court, if adversarially well-informed, may 
often be a better source of a meaningful retrospective review.118  
The inevitable limitations of nonspecialized courts, however, also 
suggest limits on the scope of a court’s authority to reassess the 
effects of legislative and regulatory enactments.  Courts are 
relatively well-suited to determine the general goals of legislation.  
And courts can reasonably address the task of determining 
whether a challenged policy substantially advances, in actual 
practice, any specified public purpose, again absent any claims of 
fundamental constitutional rights violations. 
 
111 See Wiener & Ribiero, supra note 105, at 7. 
112 See id. at 7, 23. 
113 See id. at 7. 
114 See id. at 7 n.44. 
115 See Miller, supra note 105, at 3. 
116 See, e.g., Retrospective Review of Agency Rules, supra note 105, at 3. 
117 See id. 
118 Of course, whether the consequences of a policy are investigated by the agency 
involved, by the courts, or by some other entity, the work of teasing out the most 
important causal relationships in a complex and constantly evolving social 
environment, making judgments as to the likely causal effects and as to what might 
have happened in the absence of the policy, or under some alternative to that policy, 
will always be difficult at best. See, e.g., Measuring, supra note 105, at 7; Cropper, 
supra note 105, at 1376 (noting that useful “control group[s]” will not always be 
available for comparison); THE MAGENTA BOOK, supra note 105, at 19. Beyond some 
point, of course, even the best-informed courts, with the fullest data, may rightly be 
unsure as to causality. See, for example, the discussion by Justice Breyer in the violent 
video game aggression case of Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 853 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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However, courts also lack any absolute or even any 
comparative advantage119 over legislatures, agencies, or various 
nongovernmental associations beyond this initial threshold 
inquiry120  We should not replace the tiers of scrutiny with a 
system that authorizes generalized courts to try to broadly assess 
or compare the various tangible and intangible, short-term and 
long-term, direct and indirect costs of a policy and its alternatives 
and then somehow evaluate the policy’s relevant qualities, costs, 
and benefits.121  Of course, it is technically possible to think of a 
 
119 See generally R. George Wright, At What Is the Supreme Court Comparatively 
Advantaged?, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 535, 556 (2013). 
120 Thus, courts in a post-tiers of scrutiny regime should not seek to determine 
which policies would maximize social and economic benefits, let alone which policies 
would maximize benefits net of their costs. Such efforts, if undertaken at all, can best 
be left to agencies, whatever their own biases and limitations. See Aldy, supra note 
105, at 15. 
121 For some of the remarkable, and often inescapable, complications of various 
forms of cost-benefit analysis, see, for example, MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. 
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6 (2006) (distinguishing 
well-being from economic efficiency and emphasizing the important differences among 
kinds of preferences); E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (5th ed. 
2007); B. GUY PETERS, ET AL., DESIGNING FOR POLICY EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2018) 
(“Effectiveness serves as the basic goal of any design, upon which other goals, such  
as efficiency and equity, are built.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
REVOLUTION (2018); Jennifer Baxter, Lisa Robinson & James Hammitt, White Paper: 
Retrospective Cost Benefit Analysis, DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-retrospective-benefit-
cost-analysis-664 (noting the problem of the cumulative burdens of multiple policies); 
Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 
1732, 1738–39 (2014) (on the inclusion of incommensurable dignity, in an 
unmonetized form, in cost benefit analyses); Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The 
Uneasy Case For Regulatory Breakeven Analysis, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1472 (2014) 
(cognitive biases as commonly affecting a breakeven analysis); Gregory C. Keating, Is 
Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 198–99 (2018) 
(contrasting consequentialist and deontological approaches; benefit and harm 
asymmetries; and considering optimal levels of grave harms); RICHARD LAYARD & 
STEPHEN GLAISTER, INTRODUCTION, IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1994); Allan 
McConnell, Policy Success, Policy Failure, and Grey Areas in Between, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y 
345 (2010) (on the multiple dimensions and magnitudes of a policy’s success and 
failure, along with the multiplicity of possible causal influences and scenarios); Allan 
McConnell, What Is Policy Failure? A Primer to Help Navigate the Maze, 30 PUB. POL’Y 
& ADMIN. 221 (2015); David Marsh & Allan McConnell, Towards a Framework For 
Establishing Policy Success, 88 PUB. ADMIN. 564 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. 
Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Thirty Six Questions (and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 177–88 
(2014) (discussing problems of wide disparities in the ranges of predicted costs and 
benefits; unascertainable probabilities; variability in cost-benefit ratios under 
alternative probability assumptions; crucial differences among alternative discount 
rates; risk reductions that lead to increased risks in other respects; quantification and 
the values of privacy and dignity; and the sheer magnitude of costs or benefits versus 
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fundamental rights violation as a kind of “cost.”  But it is also still 
sensible to allow courts to determine, in particular, the presence 
or absence of a fundamental constitutional rights violation.  This 
particular task is rightly recognized as properly the distinctive 
province of the courts.122 
The limited task of judging whether a given legislative goal 
has been substantially advanced in practice is merely a single 
narrow element of the much more ambitious, complex, uncertain, 
and deservedly controversial process of broad cost-benefit 
analysis, which in turn comes in a wide range of varieties.123  The 
exercise of expert policy discretion in the context of multiple basic 
uncertainties is close to the essence of cost-benefit analysis.124  At 
this task, nonexpert general jurisdiction courts generally have no 
absolute or comparative advantage.125  Generally permitting 
courts to subject legislative policy decisions to any form of 
cost-benefit analysis would again undermine basic rule of law 
values126 such as simplicity, predictability, and constraint on 
judicial discretion and subjectivity.  There would be costs as well  
 
 
 
 
 
ratios of costs and benefits); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, VALIDATING 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COST AND BENEFITS  
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND  
TRIBAL ENTITIES 41 (2005), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ 
omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf (“[P]eople may value 
actual lost benefits differently than anticipated benefits.”); Matthew Walmsley, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Commitment Device, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 455–61 (2015) 
(noting the increasing obsolescence over time of the assumptions underlying both cost 
and benefit assumptions). 
122 See, for example, the unresolved complications referred to parenthetically 
supra note 121. For the merest inkling of some of complications of judicial 
examinations of cost-benefit analyses, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 
1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991). For a classic divided judicial response to some related 
problems, see the several opinions in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6, 66, 68, 69, 70 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). For a confessedly rare endorsement of the court’s second 
guessing of the agency’s cost-benefit analysis in Corrosion Proof Fittings, see Jonathan 
S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 955 (2018). 
123 For some indication of these further complications, see the literature referred 
to supra note 121. 
124 Consider merely the question of how to approach valuations and comparisons 
involving human dignity, as noted in Bayefsky, supra note 121, at 1735–36; Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1377–78 (2014). 
125 See Wright, supra note 119, at 545. 
126 See the authorities cited supra note 4. 
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to the separation of powers, to matching discretionary political 
power with political accountability, and even in discouraging the 
judicial professional virtue of reasonable judicial humility.127 
This means that courts should, unless otherwise authorized, 
avoid undertaking any familiar form of broad and largely 
discretionary cost-benefit analysis.  There are admittedly some 
instances in which courts might, up to a point, usefully critique 
programs where the substantial advancement of a government 
interest comes at the expense of other important interests, or with 
an excess of sheer waste.128  Consider, for example, the costs often 
associated with the assumedly substantial benefits, in some 
respects, of typical programs of residential rent control,129 
occupational licensing requirements,130 attempts at educational 
 
127 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred 
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 205–06 (2003); R. George Wright, The 
Rule of Law: A Currently Incoherent Idea That Can Be Redeemed Through Virtue, 43 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1142–43 (2015). 
128 As accounted for in MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 227–
28 (1982); GORDON TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 4 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 
Liberty Fund 2005). 
129 Overall, typical residential rent control regulations are commonly disfavored 
by economists on various grounds. See, e.g., Blair Jenkins, Rent Control: Do 
Economists Agree?, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 73, 106 (2009); Walter Block, A Critique of the 
Legal and Philosophical Case for Rent Control, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 75, 75 (2002); 
Rebecca Diamond, Timothy McQuade & Franklin Qian, The Effects of Rent Control 
Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence From San Francisco, 
CATO INST. (April 18, 2018), www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-economic-
policy/effects-rent-control; Rent Control, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Feb. 7, 2012, 8:08 
AM), www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control. But the Supreme Court of the United 
States has legitimized such rent control programs, at least under traditional 
minimum scrutiny standards. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13–14 
(1988). Such programs can also provide long-term, as well as short-term, benefits to 
some parties. See, e.g., Rebecca Diamond, What Does Economic Evidence Tell Us  
About the Effects of Rent Control?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 18, 2018), 
www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economic-evidence; Margaret Jane Radin, 
Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359–60, 370 (1986) (noting the 
value of maintained personal property and sustained community). For a broad survey, 
see generally Lisa Sturtevant, The Impacts of Rent Control: A Research Review and 
Synthesis, NMHC RES. FOUND. (May 2018), https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/ 
knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-review-final2.pdf. 
130 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 129–31 (2002 ed.); 
Morris Kleiner & Alan B. Kruger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational 
Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LABOR ECON. 173, 198 (2013) (noting the lesser 
impact of government certification, as opposed to mandatory licensing requirements). 
For a sense of the existing case law on current tiers of scrutiny analysis, Niang v. 
Carroll, 879 F.3d 870, 873 (8th Cir. 2018), dismissed as moot sub nom. Niang v. 
Tomblinson, 139 S. Ct. 319 (2018) (mem.); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 
227 (5th Cir. 2013) (a statutory occupational barrier to entry into the trade of casket 
making as not rationally related to any legitimate state interest); Sensational Smiles, 
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quality reform,131 and the so-called “war on drugs.”132  But even in 
these subject matter areas, it is far from clear that courts would, 
in practice, typically outperform legislatures or specialized 
agencies, especially as the relevant actors are moved by newly 
emerging and increasingly political pressures. 
CONCLUSION 
In some cases, political movements may inspire desirable 
policy change without any crucial judicial intervention.133  Perhaps 
this should happen more often than it does.134  But the replacement 
 
LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286–87 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing cases to the contrary, 
including St. Joseph Abbey, but then upholding mere rent-seeking legal barriers to 
occupational entry by potential competitors); Patel v. Texas Dep’t Licensing & 
Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 90 (Tex. 2015) (licensing rules as violating the substantive 
due process rights of commercial eyebrow threaders in a “burdensome” and 
“oppressive” fashion). 
131 Note the actual consequences and aftermath of the once touted No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, as ultimately superseded by the Every Student Succeeds Act of 
2015. See generally, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 
Stat. 1425 (2002); Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 
1802 (2015) (devolving much authority to the individual states); Laura Adler-Greene, 
Every Student Succeeds Act: Are Schools Making Sure Every Student Succeeds, 35 
TOURO L. REV. 11, 12–14, 18–20 (2019). Note also the much broader option of the 
statutory “sunsetting” of legislation. See generally Brian Baugus & Feler Bose,  
Sunset Legislation: Balancing the Legislature and the Executive, MERCATUS CENTER 
(August 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/sunset-legislation-
states-balancing-legislature-and-executive. 
132 See, e.g., Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: 
The Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. (Apr. 12, 2017), 
www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-and-counting; The War on 
Drugs, ACLU (2019), https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/sentencing-reform/ 
war-drugs; George P. Shultz & Pedro Aspe, The Failed War On Drugs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 31, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/12/31/opinion/failed-war-on-drugs.html.  
133 Consider the congressional response to, for example, the No Child Left Behind 
Act, supra note 131. The electoral politics of the War on Drugs may also be shifting. 
See, e.g., Tom Angell, Kamala Harris Calls for Legalizing Marijuana and Ending the 
War on Drugs in New Book, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tom 
angell/2019/01/08/kamala-harris-calls-for-legalizing-marijuana-and-ending-war-on-
drugs-in-new-book/#65fb7dae2eee (book review). It is, more broadly, possible for 
Congress to statutorily authorize courts to in effect repeal what is assumed to have 
been initially appropriate but is now thought to be “obsolete” or “outmoded” 
legislation, subject to possible legislative reenactment. This is the well-known 
proposal embodied in GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
59 (1982). For responses to Judge Calabresi’s proposal, see generally Archibald Cox, 
70 CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1982); Allan C. Hutchison & Derek Morgan, The Calabresian 
Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1982).  
134 See PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN 
DO BETTER 59 (2014) (“Occasionally, government officials acknowledge that one of 
their long-standing policies has failed and should be abandoned. Such confessions of 
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for tiered judicial scrutiny argued for herein does not leave the 
public without crucial protections against well-entrenched but 
failed legislation.135  On our approach, courts would not attempt to 
engage in broadly discretionary cost-benefit analysis136 but would 
also certainly not defer generally to legislative action.137  Our 
approach would insist, instead, on a showing that the legislation, 
in actual practice, substantially or otherwise meaningfully 
promotes any one or more of the public purposes or goals 
reasonably ascribable to the legislation in question.138  As well, on 
our suggested approach, any meaningful violation of a party’s 
fundamental constitutional rights139 should result not in the 
application of any form of tiered judicial scrutiny, but, more 
predictably, in a judgment and redress for that injured party.140 
More generally, the reforms suggested above simultaneously 
promote more effective legislation, the reduction of legislative 
waste, fuller respect for basic constitutional rights, and various 
uncontroversial elements of the rule of law,141 including simplicity, 
predictability, and a reduced scope for judicial subjectivity and 
undue discretion, along with an appropriate respect for the 
separation of powers. 
 
governmental error are to be strongly encouraged, of course, but they are usually 
belated and exceedingly rare.”). 
135 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 14–15 
136 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
137 See cases cited supra notes 14–15. 
138 See supra Part II. For concerns as to the proper timing of judicial review, see 
supra note 96. 
139 We assume that tiered scrutiny analysis, including exacting scrutiny and strict 
scrutiny, will tend to be more practically manipulable by any given court than will the 
prior question of whether a fundamental constitutional right claim is present to begin 
with. For a sense of historical trends in the latter context, see cases cited supra  
note 75. 
140 See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
141 Among the most widely cited elements of the rule of law are: (1) the ability of 
governed parties to reasonably know, in advance, of the considerations likely to 
effectively determine judicial outcomes; (2) the minimization or reduction of  
what amounts to retroactive legal determinations; (3) avoidance of frequent or 
unpredictable substantial changes in what the law is held to require or permit; 
(4) reasonable clarity, consistency, and stability in the law, particularly in its 
application through administrative decrees and judicial decisions; and (5) appropriate 
limits on executive discretion. Many of these basic rule of law themes are shared 
among the authors cited supra note 4. For a concise and representative example, see 
Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 67–83 (2009). See also BRIAN 
Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 1–8 (2007); 
R. George Wright, The Magna Carta and the Contemporary Rule of Law Problem, 54 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 243, 243–44 (2016); Wright, supra note 127, at 1125–27. 
